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Effective Altruism and Collective
Obligations
ALEXANDER DIETZ
University of Southern California
Effective altruism (EA) is a movement devoted to the idea of doing good in the most
effective way possible. EA has been the target of a number of critiques. In this article,
I focus on one prominent critique: that EA fails to acknowledge the importance of
institutional change. One version of this critique claims that EA relies on an overly
individualistic approach to ethics. Defenders of EA have objected that this charge either
fails to identify a problem with EA’s core idea that each of us should do the most good
we can, or makes unreasonable claims about what we should do. However, I argue that
we can understand the critique in a way that is well motivated, and that can avoid these
objections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective altruism (EA) is a young social movement devoted to the idea
of doing good in the most effective way possible.1 According to William
MacAskill, one of its founders, EA ‘is about asking, “How can I make
the biggest difference I can?” and using evidence and careful reasoning
to try to find an answer’.2
This movement has been the target of a number of critiques.3 In
this article, I will focus on one prominent critique: the charge that EA
fails to acknowledge the importance of institutional change. According
to this institutional critique, effective altruists (EAs) focus only on
how they can do the most good within existing political and economic
institutions, and therefore neglect the good that could be done by
reforming these institutions.4
1 For introductions to effective altruism, see William MacAskill, Doing Good Better
(London, 2016); Peter Singer, The Most Good You Can Do (London, 2015).
2 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, pp. 14–15.
3 For overviews, see Iason Gabriel, ‘Effective Altruism and its Critics’, Journal of
Applied Philosophy 34 (2017), pp. 457–73; Jeff McMahan, ‘Philosophical Critiques of
Effective Altruism’, The Philosophers’ Magazine 73 (2016), pp. 92–9.
4 See Amia Srinivasan, ‘Stop the Robot Apocalypse’, London Review of Books 37
(2015), pp. 3–6; Lisa Herzog, ‘Can “Effective Altruism” Really Change the World?’, open-
Democracy, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/lisa-herzog/can-effective-
altruism-really-change-world〉> (2016); Gabriel, ‘Effective Altruism and its Critics’. For
responses, see Robert Wiblin, ‘Effective Altruists Love Systemic Change’, 80,000 Hours,
<http://80000hours.org/2015/07/effective-altruists-love-systemic-change/〉> (2015);
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Brian Berkey has recently argued that the institutional critique
either fails to identify a problem with EA’s core idea that each of us
should do the most good we can, or makes unreasonable claims about
what we should do.5 In this article, I argue that one version of this
critique does in fact represent an effective challenge to EA. On this
version of the critique, EA relies on an overly individualistic approach
to ethics, neglecting the importance of our collective obligations, or
obligations that are possessed by groups of people as such, rather than
by individuals.6 I argue that EAs have good reasons to take collective
obligations seriously. And, I argue, critics do not need to claim that
these collective obligations imply that EA is incorrect in its claims
about our individual obligations. Instead, I suggest, the problem is not
that EA is incorrect, but simply that it is incomplete. EAs should care
not only about how each of us can do the most good as individuals, but
also about how we can do the most good together.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE
Again, the institutional critique claims that EAs neglect the
importance of reforming political and economic institutions. EAs often
claim that one of the most effective ways to do good is to help
people living in extreme poverty. According to Iason Gabriel, many
of the changes we could make that would most help these people are
‘institutional or systemic’ in nature.7 For example, Gabriel suggests
that trade reform and better financial regulation could lift millions
of people out of poverty; others suggest much more radical examples,
such as anti-capitalist revolution.8 But despite their good intentions,
critics charge, EAs do not devote sufficient effort to bringing about such
changes, and may even make them less likely.9
One version of this critique appeals to the idea of collective
obligations, or obligations that are possessed by groups of people as
such. In particular, some critics suggest that certain groups, such as
McMahan, ‘Philosophical Critiques’; Brian Berkey, ‘The Institutional Critique of
Effective Altruism’, Utilitas, 30 (2018), pp. 143–71.
5 Berkey, ‘Institutional Critique’.
6 See Frank Jackson, ‘Group Morality’, Metaphysics and Morality, ed. Philip Pettit,
Richard Sylvan and Jean Norman (Oxford, 1987), pp. 91–110; Derek Parfit, ‘What We
Together Do’ (ms.); Alexander Dietz, ‘What We Together Ought to Do’, Ethics 126 (2016),
pp. 955–82.
7 Gabriel, ‘Effective Altruism and its Critics’, p. 468.
8 See Matthew Snow, ‘Against Charity’, Jacobin, <http://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/
08/peter-singer-charity-effective-altruism/〉> (2015); and Srinivasan, ‘Robot Apoca-
lypse’.
9 Gabriel, ‘Effective Altruism and its Critics’, p. 468.
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the global rich, have an obligation to enact institutional reforms.10
And if you are a member of a group that has an obligation to enact
institutional reforms, we might think, then you individually have an
obligation, or at least a strong reason, to do your part in helping
to bring about those reforms.11 But EA, critics charge, is ‘profoundly
individualistic’, and therefore ignores such considerations.12
Berkey argues, however, that critics of EA cannot successfully defend
these claims. We can summarize Berkey’s argument as offering a
dilemma to proponents of the critique.
On the one hand, as Gabriel notes, institutional reforms, such as
reforms to central trade or financial policies, have very large-scale
effects. So if my efforts would be instrumental in bringing about some
good institutional reform, this is a good candidate for being the most
effective way that I can do good. But in that case, Berkey argues, the
idea that we should promote institutional reform is consistent with
EA.13 It may be that EAs in fact tend to ignore these opportunities, but
this would not indicate anything wrong with the core commitment of
EA.
On the other hand, Berkey argues, if my efforts will not be
instrumental in bringing about the institutional reform – for example,
because there will not be enough support to bring about the change
despite my efforts – then it seems unreasonable to claim that I
ought to devote my efforts there rather than elsewhere. It seems
unreasonable, that is, to claim that instead of meeting the urgent needs
of people or animals, I ought to spend my limited resources in a way
that will be futile, because too few others will support the reform in
question.14
In short, EAs can indeed recommend that individuals devote
themselves to institutional reforms, when doing so would be
instrumental in bringing about these reforms. And when this is not
the case, it is implausible that individuals should devote themselves to
institutional reforms rather than to causes where their efforts would
do more good.
10 Srinivasan, ‘Robot Apocalypse’; Herzog, ‘Can “Effective Altruism” Really Change
the World?’.
11 Herzog, ‘Can “Effective Altruism” Really Change the World?’; Berkey, ‘Institutional
Critique’, pp. 12–13.
12 Srinivasan, ‘Robot Apocalypse’.
13 Berkey, ‘Institutional Critique’, pp. 153–4. See also Peter Singer, ‘The Logic
of Effective Altruism’, Boston Review, <http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/peter-
singer-logic-effective-altruism> (2015); Wiblin, ‘Effective Altruists Love Systemic
Change’.
14 Berkey, ‘Institutional Critique’, p. 158.
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III. WHY EFFECTIVE ALTRUISTS SHOULD TAKE
COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS SERIOUSLY
I think the appeal to collective obligations has more going for it than
Berkey gives it credit for. I will first motivate this appeal by showing
how the issue of institutional reform can be seen as a symptom of a
more basic underlying problem. I will then suggest how we can avoid
this problem without running into Berkey’s objections.
On my proposal, the problem identified by the institutional critique
is a special case of a more basic problem first identified in the
philosophical literature by Allan Gibbard, and discussed at length by
Donald Regan.15 While Gibbard and Regan present this problem as a
challenge for act-utilitarianism, their point straightforwardly applies
to EA as well. The problem is that even when we each individually
produce the best outcome we can, given what other people are doing,
we may together be producing an outcome that is worse than one we
could have produced.
Gibbard and Regan illustrate this problem by discussing cases with
the following structure. Suppose that you and I can each choose
between two actions, A and B. Depending on what we do, we will
produce one of four possible outcomes:
You
do A do B
I do A Second-best Bad
do B Bad Best
Suppose that we both do A. In that case, each of us will be doing
the most good we can, given what the other person is doing. That is,
given that you do A, I produce the best results by doing A, and vice
versa. Thus, we will both succeed at doing what EA tells us to do. But
together, we will be making things less good than we could have, since
we could have made the outcome better if we had both done B.
The idea that EAs neglect institutions can be seen as an instance
of this type of case. For example, suppose that EAs have to decide
whether to send their charitable donations to GiveDirectly, which
transfers money directly to extremely poor people, or to a political
15 Allan Gibbard, ‘Rule-Utilitarianism: Merely an Illusory Alternative?’, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 43 (1965), pp. 211–20; Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-
operation (New York, 1980). The kind of example that Gibbard and Regan focus on is
similar to the ‘Hi-Lo’ and ‘Stag Hunt’ examples discussed in economics and decision
theory.
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advocacy group lobbying to remove restrictions on immigration. For
simplicity, let’s again suppose that there are just two people, you
and me. For each of us who donates to GiveDirectly, one person will
ultimately be able to rise out of poverty. On the other hand, if we
both donate to the advocacy group, the group will muster enough
support to remove the immigration restrictions, which will have the
effect of lifting millions of people out of poverty. But if only one of us
donates to the advocacy group, this donation will accomplish nothing,
and someone will remain in poverty whom we could otherwise have
benefited. In this case, if we both donate to GiveDirectly, each of us
will do the most good we can, given what the other is doing. Thus, we
will succeed at doing what EA tells us to do. But again, we will together
have failed to make the outcome as good as it could have been if we had
acted differently.
It is important to note that this is not the only way to understand
the institutional critique. As Berkey notes, for example, proponents
of the institutional critique might be understood as arguing that EAs
neglect important moral considerations that are not based on the idea
of doing the most good we can, such as distinctive reasons of justice.16
And while I have suggested simply that reforming institutions may
be one way in which we can together do the most good, critics might
think that the nature of certain institutions gives us special reasons to
focus on them. For example, we might think that we have a collective
obligation to reform our healthcare system, not simply because this is
one way to do good, but because we have special obligations to provide
for the basic needs of members of our own society.
My proposed interpretation of the critique, however, is one that EAs
in particular have reason to find troubling. After all, many EAs have a
broadly consequentialist outlook that is sceptical of distinctive reasons
of justice, or, even if they accept such reasons, believe that they are not
as strong as our reasons to alleviate the suffering of people in extreme
poverty or of animals in factory farms. But it seems likely that EAs
would not be happy if their efforts at addressing exactly these problems
are not doing nearly as much good as they could be.
How do these cases motivate the appeal to collective obligations?
When considering cases like this, as Derek Parfit writes, it seems ‘in
some sense obvious’ what we ought to do: we ought to bring about the
best outcome.17 But we can’t justify this claim by appealing to the idea
that we individually ought to do the most good we can, because as we’ve
seen, that will be true even if we bring about the second-best outcome.
16 Berkey, ‘Institutional Critique’, pp. 163–4.
17 Parfit, ‘What We Together Do’.
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A natural alternative is to understand the claim that we ought to bring
about the best outcome as a claim about what we collectively ought
to do. That is, we can understand this as a claim about an obligation
possessed by the group as such, rather than merely a shorthand for
claims about the obligations of the individual members of the group,
such as obligations to try to cooperate with one another.18 Thus, rather
than focusing on the idea that each of us individually ought to do the
most good we can, the critic can argue, EAs need to recognize that we
collectively ought to do the most good we can.
Now, Holly Lawford-Smith has argued that it only makes sense
to attribute obligations to groups that possess certain kinds of
organization, and that are thus organized enough to be considered
‘agents’.19 This is because it is plausible to accept some version of the
idea that ‘ought implies can’, and it is plausible that only agents can
have the relevant kinds of ability. In contrast, other philosophers argue
that even highly disorganized groups such as strangers witnessing an
attack in a subway car, or humanity as a whole, can be capable of
having obligations.20 I will not attempt to resolve this dispute here. I
will note, however, that even if we think that only highly organized
groups are capable of having obligations, the various EA-aligned
organizations could plausibly qualify. In addition, the EA community
as a whole seems to have a significant degree of organization: EAs
generally agree on a common set of values, and frequently work
together in the various groups that are aligned with the movement,
and in more general conferences. So on a somewhat looser standard,
the EA community as a whole could also qualify as having obligations.
Are EAs actually facing a situation like those I have described?
Do EAs actually have opportunities to collectively do more good
by promoting institutional reforms that they are failing to pursue,
because of their tendency to focus instead on giving to charities like
GiveDirectly? This is a difficult empirical question. As of this writing,
one prominent EA organization, Giving What We Can, reports that
its members have so far donated about $25 million to charities they
18 For a more detailed defence of this proposal, see Dietz, ‘What We Together Ought to
Do’, pp. 960–3.
19 Lawford-Smith, ‘What “We”?’, Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2015), pp. 225–49. See
also Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency (Oxford, 2011); Stephanie Collins,
‘Collectives’ Duties and Collectivization Duties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91
(2013), pp. 231–48.
20 See Virginia Held, ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally
Responsible?’, The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), pp. 471–81, at 476–7; Wringe, ‘Global
Obligations and the Agency Objection’, Ratio 23 (2010): 217–31; David Killoren and
Bekka Williams, ‘Group Agency and Overdetermination’, Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice 16 (2013), pp. 295–307; Anne Schwenkenbecher, ‘Joint Duties and Global Moral
Obligations’, Ratio 26 (2013), pp. 310–28.
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believe to be highly effective. Critics might suggest that these EAs
might instead have done more good by reserving this money to spend
on political campaigns. For example, in 2016, they might have used
this money to oppose the United Kingdom’s referendum on leaving
the European Union, and the presidential campaign of Donald Trump,
both of which won by narrow margins, and both of which arguably
have done and will continue to do serious damage on immigration,
trade, and a variety of other institutional issues. On the other hand,
it is hard to say whether even $25 million would have affected either of
these outcomes. After all, Hillary Clinton’s loss to Trump came despite
the fact that her campaign outspent his by about $370 million.21
Even if EAs are not currently facing a situation like this, however,
it is certainly possible that they will face such a situation at some
point. After all, even if EA as a movement is not yet large enough to
be able to have significant political influence, that could change. In
addition, we have some reason to expect that even as EA grows, it may
continue to largely avoid institutional causes. After all, one of EA’s
core recommendations is that individuals should focus on causes that
are ‘neglected’, so that they can have a greater marginal impact.22 But
since efforts to affect institutions, such as political campaigns, often
draw a lot of attention, this suggests that EAs might continue to avoid
focusing on these efforts.
IV. WHY COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS NEED NOT AFFECT
INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS
Again, on my proposal, the problem for EA brought out by the issue of
institutional reform is the idea that even if we succeed at doing what
EA tells us to do, and individually do the most good we can, we may
collectively fail to make the outcome as good as we could have made
it. This problem shows why critics might plausibly argue that we need
to recognize a collective obligation to do the most good we can. I will
now argue that critics can make this appeal without running into the
objections we saw earlier.
My proposal is simple. EA is deficient, critics can argue, in so far as
it fails to recognize our collective obligations to do good. But we can
do this without rejecting EA’s core idea that each of us should do the
most good we can. We just need to claim both that each of us should
do the most good individually, and that we should do the most good
21 Niv M. Sultan, ‘Election 2016: Trump’s free media helped keep cost down, but fewer
donors provided more of the cash’, OpenSecrets.org, <http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2017/04/election-2016-trump-fewer-donors-provided-more-of-the-cash/〉> (2017).
22 MacAskill, Doing Good Better.
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820818000158
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cardiff University, on 14 Sep 2018 at 15:08:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
8 Alexander Dietz
collectively. In other words, the problem is not that EA is mistaken,
but rather that it is incomplete.
What Gibbard/Regan cases show is that even if we succeed at doing
what EA tells us to do, we could fail to be collectively doing the most
good. But these cases do not show that we have to choose between doing
the most good individually and doing the most good collectively. After
all, in our earlier example, if we both donate to immigration reform,
then we each will have done the most good we can, given what the
other is doing. And in fact, as Regan argues, whenever we produce the
best outcome we can collectively, it must be true that each of us has
produced the best outcome we could individually. This is because if I
could have produced a better outcome by performing some alternative
action, that would have to mean that we could have produced a
better outcome by performing the set of actions that included this
alternative.23 So we can adopt the claim that we should collectively do
the most good without rejecting the claim that we should individually
do the most good.
This proposal can be understood as refocusing the institutional
critique. Again, it is natural to understand the critique as claiming
that individuals ought to try to work towards changes to the collective
behaviour that we carry out through our institutions. In contrast, my
proposal moves the focus from collective behaviour merely as an object
of individual action to the idea of a collective subject of action: to
thinking about the opportunities to do good that we have as a group.
This proposal also avoids the problems associated with both horns
of our earlier dilemma. On this proposal, we can agree with EA
that individuals should promote institutional reforms only if doing so
would be the most effective thing they can do. We don’t have to claim
that individuals should promote institutional reforms even when their
efforts wouldn’t make a difference to bringing about these reforms,
so that they could instead do more good elsewhere. But we’ve still
identified a real shortcoming in the core EA philosophy. Even if EAs
are right about what individuals should do, they need to think more
about what they collectively should do.
V. IS THIS PROPOSAL RELEVANT IN PRACTICE?
The proposal I have offered invites a number of possible objections. I
will close by discussing one challenge that may be particularly relevant
to and worrisome for my proposal, and offering a brief sketch of how
we might respond.
23 Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, pp. 54–5.
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The challenge is this: how, exactly, is recognizing collective
obligations supposed to make a practical difference for EAs? After
all, collective actions can only come about through individual actions.
So if EAs are still committed to following their individual obligations,
and if recognizing collective obligations to do good doesn’t tell us
anything about our individual obligations, how is this recognition
supposed to influence their behaviour?
For example, an EAmight protest that in a Gibbard/Regan case, each
of us might know that the other will do A. And in that case, if we retain
the idea that each of us should simply do what does the most good
individually, then we will still produce the suboptimal outcome. So how
can my proposal explain how we could avoid situations like this?
Of course, we might say that even if recognizing collective obligations
would not make a practical difference, it is still important to do
this for theoretical reasons. But if it were true that recognizing
these obligations would not make a practical difference, this would
significantly detract from the force of the institutional critique of EA.
After all, EAs are primarily concerned not with purely theoretical
questions but rather with how to do the most good in practice.
I suggest that we instead respond to this challenge as follows. In ad-
dition to being motivated to doing the most good they can individually,
EAs could engage in what economists and decision theorists call ‘team
reasoning’.24 The central idea of team reasoning is that I might decide
to perform some action not on the grounds that this action is itself seen
as ideal in some way, but on the grounds that this action is my part in
some group action that is seen as ideal in some way. Theorists argue
that team reasoning can help agents to solve coordination problems,
such as Gibbard/Regan cases. Thus, if EAs take some group action to be
ideal in virtue of being one that they have a collective obligation to per-
form, and they are team reasoners, this could lead them to coordinate.
Now, if I decide to perform some action because it is my part in
some group action that we have an obligation to perform, this might
be because I have decided that I have an individual obligation to do
my part. But if our collective obligations need not make a difference to
our individual obligations, as I have suggested, then this won’t work.
Luckily, there is no reason to assume that I will decide to do my part
only if and because I believe that I have an individual obligation to do
24 Robert Sugden, ‘Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish
Behavior’, Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1993), pp. 69–89; Michael Bacharach,
‘Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Co-operation’, Research
in Economics 53 (1999), pp. 117–47; Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and
Frames in Game Theory, ed. Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden (Princeton and Oxford,
2006); Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden, ‘Theories of Team Agency’, Rationality and
Commitment, ed. Fabienne Peter and Hans Bernhard Schmid (Oxford, 2007), pp. 280–
312.
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so. After all, it seems clear that we do not in general perform actions
only when and because we believe we are obligated to perform them.
Finally, it is crucial to recognize that being a team reasoner is
not necessarily in competition with being motivated to do the most
good individually. For one thing, as team reasoning theorists have
argued, team reasoners can be ‘circumspect’: their decision to do
their part can be sensitive to whether they expect other members of
the group to do their parts.25 More generally, EAs’ commitment to
doing the most good they can individually could serve as what Peter
Railton calls a ‘counterfactual condition’: although they might have
other motivations, such as a motivation to do their part, it might
also be true that they would never knowingly act in a way that was
incompatible with doing the most good individually.26 For example,
once we recognize that we together ought to contribute to immigration
reform, team reasoning could lead each of us to do our parts, and
donate. But it might also be true that each of us would not have
decided to donate if we believed that this would prevent us doing the
most good we could do individually.
Now, again, this is only a brief sketch of how wemight respond to this
challenge. There are difficult theoretical questions about the nature
of coordination, and I do not claim to have resolved these questions.
Instead, what I hope to have done is to shift the debate. In order
to resist the institutional critique as I have presented it, EAs will
have to defend substantial views in moral psychology and the theory
of collective action. They cannot simply dismiss the critique on the
grounds that it either does not raise any real problems for their view,
or has implausible implications for what individuals ought to do.
Interestingly, EAs themselves seem to be starting to accept the
practical importance of thinking about doing good in collective terms,
rather than only in individual terms. In his opening talk at the 2017
global EA conference in San Francisco, MacAskill argued that as the
community has grown, it has become more important to move from
asking ‘How do I do the most good?’ to asking ‘How can we do the most
good?’.27 In fact, the conference’s theme was ‘Doing Good Together’.28
alex.dietz@gmail.com
25 Bacharach, ‘Interactive Team Reasoning’.
26 Railton, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy
and Public Affairs 13 (1984), pp. 134–71.
27 MacAskill, ‘Opening Talk’, <http://www.eaglobal.org/talks/opening-talk-sf/〉>
(2017).
28 For helpful feedback and discussion, I would like to thank Amy Berg, Mark
Schroeder, Jonathan Quong, and an audience at the Second Annual PPE Society
Meeting.
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